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NOTES 
Social Security Disability Determinations: The 
Burden of Proof on Appeal 
In I 956, the Social Security Act1 was amended to provide 
monthly disability insurance benefits to qualifying individuals 
under a uniform national program administered by the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.2 Under this program, a claimant is 
entitled to disability benefits if he is unable to "engage in any sub-
stantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to be of long 
continued and indefinite duration."3 This definition and its accom-
panying statutory standards were purposely made conservative in 
order to minimize the problems inherent in initiating the program;4< 
it was contemplated that improvements and adjustments would be 
made when experience with the administration of the program was 
acquired.5 
The I 956 amendments also provide for administrative and judi-
cial review of disability determinations through an intricate appel-
late procedure, including an appeal of a disallowance determination 
to the federal district courts.6 The great majority of disability cases 
I. Social Security Act § 103, 70 Stat. 815 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1958). This legis-
lation is basically an extension of the 1954 amendments which had provided the so• 
called "disability freeze." Social Security Act § 106(a)-(b), 68 Stat. 1079 (1954), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 413(a)(2)(1), 414(a)(l) (Supp V, 1964). See Rowland, Judicial 
Review of Disability Determinations, 52 GEO. L.J. 42-59 (1963), for an excellent dis-
cussion of the complete statutory and administrative pattern and legislative history 
of the disability benefits program; see generally Abraham &: Wolkstein, Workman's 
Compensation and the Social Security Disability Program-A Contrast, 16 VAND. L. 
REv. 1055 (1963); Longshore, The Social Security Disability Insurance Program-An 
Example of the Necessity for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 25 ALA. 
LAw 282 (1964); Myers, Disability Benefit Provisions Under the Social Security Act-
An Early Report, 16 J. AM. Soc'Y C.L.U. 5 (1962). 
2. The determinations of disability are made by state agencies, usually vocational 
rehabilitation agencies, under specific agreements with the federal government and 
according to standards prescribed by the Secretary. Social Security Act § 22l(a), 68 
StaL 1081 (1954), as amended, 42 u.s.c. § 421 (1958). See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINIS· 
TRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEAI.TII, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK 
135 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK]. 
3. Social Security Act § 216(i)(l), 68 Stat. 1080 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(l) (1958) 
and § 223(c)(2), 70 Stat. 815 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (1958). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 
(1962). 
4. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1954). 
5. Ibid. See note 49 infra and accompanying text. 
6. The decision of the state agency is forwarded to the Department of Health, 
Education, and Vvelfare. If the decision is favorable to the claimant the Secretary 
may then alter it or deny it altogether. Social Security Act § 22l(c), 68 Stat. 1081 
(1954), 42 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1958). Following a rehearing by the state agency, the 
claimant is entitled to a hearing before a hearing examiner appointed by the Secre-
tary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 (1961). The claimant may seek review of the examiner's 
decision by .an Appeals Council; the decision of the Appeals Council, or that of the 
examiner if review is denied, becomes the final decision of the Secretary. 20 C.F.R. 
[1465] 
1466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63 
which have reached the district courts and courts of appeals have pre-
sented a single issue: whether there is "substantial evidence" in the 
record to support the Secretary's determination that the claimant is 
able to engage in substantial gainful activity.7 A significantly large 
number of courts have answered in the negative, reversing the Secre-
tary's decision.8 A primary reason for these reversals has been the 
continuing conflict between the Secretary and a majority of the re-
viewing courts as to the placement and scope of the burden of proof 
establishing disability. 
In keeping with the conservative tenor of the disability program, 
the amendments expressly place upon the applicant the burden of 
proving disability by such evidence as the Secretary may require.9 
While nearly all courts have verbally recognized this statutory pro-
vision by requiring the claimant to sustain an initial burden of 
establishing his claim with credible evidence,10 there exists a sharp 
divergence among the appellate courts as to what findings by the 
Secretary are then necessary to justify a subsequent denial of bene-
fits. The minority view, which is most consistent with both the 
statutory language and the legislative history11 of the program, 
follows the position maintained by the Court of Appeals for the 
§§ 404.940, 404.951 (1961). This procedure exhausts the claimant's administrative reme• 
dies, and he may then proceed to a federal district court. 53 Stat. 1370 (1939), as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. V, 1964). See Foster v. Flemming, 190 F. Supp. 
908 (1960), for an excellent discussion of the scope of judicial review. 
7. "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evi-
dence, shall be conclusive." Social Security Act § 205(g), 53 Stat. 1370 (1956), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g) (Supp. V, 1964); Martin v. Celebrezze, 232 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass. 1964). See 
SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK 69 for an administrative definition of "substantial gainful 
activity." See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
8. Since the inception of the disability program in 1955, 3,766 district court actions 
have been instituted. During the calendar year 1964 the district courts affirmed the 
Secretary's decision in 415 cases, reversed 239 cases, and remanded 277 cases for further 
consideration by the Department. Of the 277 remands, 137 were at the request of the 
Department, 31 were at the request of the plaintiff, and 109 on the Court's own 
motion. Letter from Arthur E. Hess, Director, Division of Disability Operations, De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, to the Michigan Law Review, Feb. 25, 
1965. 
9. "A person shall not be under a disability unless he furnishes such proof of the 
existence thereof as may be required." Social Security Act § 216(b), 68 Stat. 1080 
(1954), 42 U.S.C. 416(i)(l) (1958). See also Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 60 Stat. 
241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958) ("Except as statutes otherwise provide, the pro-
ponent of a rule or order shall have the burden of proof.'). 
10. See, e.g., Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Blankenship v. 
Celebrezze, 232 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. W. Va. 1964); Baskin v. Celebrezze, 230 F. Supp. 812 
(W .D. Mich. 1964). 
II. The compensation was intended to be for "disability," not for mere unem-
ployment or inability to carry on the claimant's former occupation. See 100 CONG. 
REc. 7444-45 (1954); Hearings on H.R. 7225 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1956); Longshore, supra note l, at 288-87. Compare 2 LARSON. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 57.34, 57.63 (1961). 
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Fifth Circuit.12 This approach places upon the claimant the burden 
of proving not only that he is disabled from performing his usual 
occupation, but also that his impairments are so severe that they 
prevent him from engaging in any form of substantial gainful em-
ployment, including work of a physically or mentally lighter type.13 
Thus, unless the claimant adduces unequivocal evidence of a 
medically-determined total and permanent disability, he must prove 
a broad negative-his inability to do any substantial gainful work-
in order to receive benefits. In denying benefits, the Secretary may 
find it necessary to rebut the claimant's contention that his failure 
to obtain employment has resulted from his physical condition; 
however, under the Fifth Circuit approach, the Secretary need not 
prove the availability of specific employment positions which the 
claimant can obtain and adequately perform.14 Consequently, courts 
adopting this view generally confine the Secretary's burden on an 
appeal to the production of credible evidence of the claimant's 
ability to do any kind of work,15 and are correspondingly hesitant 
to overrule the Secretary's finding.16 
In contrast, an increasing majority of the courts have assigned 
to the Secretary the ultimate burden of proving the claimant is 
12. The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have also adopted 
this view. 
13. E.g., Aldridge v. Celebrezze, 339 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v. Raley, 
330 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1964). A mere showing of inability to do his former work will 
not entitle the claimant to benefits, unless that is the only work he can perform. 
Witherspoon v. Celebrezze, 328 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1964). 
14. E.g., Frith v. Celebrezze, 333 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v. Kelly, 331 
F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1964); Robinson v. Celebrezze, 326 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1964); Cele-
brezze v. Sutton, 338 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1964) ("The act is not to be interpreted as 
unemployment compensation insurance.'). 
15. E.g., Celebrezze v. Sutton, supra note 14; Celebrezze v. O'Brient, 323 F.2d 989 
(5th Cir. 1963). 
16. The decisions suggest strong reliance on the Secretary's expertise; e.g., Clinch v. 
Celebrezze, 328 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v. Zimmerman, 339 F.2d 496 (5th 
Cir. 1964). Moon v. Celebrezze, IA CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. 1l 14014 (7th Cir. 1965). 
In 1964 the courts of appeals affirmed the Department's decision in 28 cases, reversed 
in 9, and remanded in 4, as follows: 
CIRCUIT AFFJRMANCES REVERSALS REMANDS 
l 0 0 0 
2 0 I 0 
3 0 0 2 
4: 2 4 l 
5 19 0 0 
6 2 3 I 
7 1 0 0 
8 1 0 0 
9 3 0 0 
10 0 1 0 --
Total 28 9 4 
Letter from Arthur E. Hess, supra note 7. Of the 28 cases in which the Depart-
ment's decision was affirmed, 22 occurred in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. 
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able to engage in substantial gainful activity.17 In addition, these 
courts have shifted to the Secretary part of the claimant's statutory 
burden of initially showing inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by requiring the Secretary to prove that a person 
with the claimant's impairment is physically able to perform some 
type of substantial gainful work. Generally, the most that these 
courts have required of the claimant for the establishment of his 
prima fade case has been the procluction of evidence of what he 
has done in the past, his present incapacity for that same type of 
work, and his lack of experience or training for any other type of 
work.18 This evidentiary requirement is held sufficiently carried in 
most instances if the claimant produces medical testimony of dis-
ability coupled with his own corroboratory testimony.19 The inquiry 
then centers upon the effect of the impairment upon the claimant's 
ability to earn a livelihood in some manner other than his former 
occupation,20 and at this point the burden of production apparently 
shifts to the Secretary. Throughout this process, these courts have 
frequently seemed to substitute their own judgment for that of the 
Secretary or lower tribunal, rather than making the determination 
on the basis of the substantiality of the evidence adduced.21 At the 
same time, they have frequently failed to distinguish between the 
burden of production and the burden of persuasion.22 
In addition to shifting the burden of production, the Court of 
17. These include the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
and Ninth Circuits. 
18. E.g., Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964); Grant v. Celebrezze, 230 
F. Supp. 595 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Powell v. Celebrezze, 230 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Ark. 1964). 
Some courts have held that the claimant's prima facie burden is met by merely 
showing inability to engage in his previous occupation. E.g., Tiley v. Celebrezze, 235 
F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Ohio 1964). The claimant need not prove disability beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Freeman v. Celebrezze, 236 F. Supp. 785 (M.D.N.C. 1964); Riddle v. 
Celebrezze, 235 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.S.C. 1964). 
19. E.g., Freeman v. Celebrezze, supra note 20; Williams v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 
627 (E.D. Ky. 1964). Where the claimant's medical evidence is insufficient to establish 
some kind of medically determined disability, the Secretary prevails because the claim-
ant has failed to sustain his prima facie burden. E.g., McMullen v. Celebrezze, 335 
F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1964); Sullivan v. Celebrezze, 236 F. Supp. 6 (W .D.S.C. 1964); 
Grahm v. Celebrezze, 230 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. W. Va. 1964). If the claimant sustains 
his prima facie burden, the Secretary must necessarily produce his own medical 
evidence in rebuttal. Where the claimant's expert medical evidence of disability is 
uncontroverted, any decision by the Secretary to the contrary must be reversed. See, 
e.g., Covey v. Celebrezze, 235 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Bagwell v. Celebrezze, 
232 F. Supp. 989 (W.D.S.C. 1964); Johnson v. Celebrezze, 232 F. Supp. 406 (D.N.D. 
1964). 
20. Miller v. Celebrezze, 233 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. W. Va. 1964). Underwood v. Ribi-
coff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962), suggested four elements of proof in determining 
ability to engage in substantial gainful activity: (1) objective medical facts, (2) expert 
medical opinion, (3) claimant's testimony, (4) claimant's educational background, 
work history, and age. 
21. See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 527-31 (1959). 
22. See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 636-37 (1954). 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit in the landmark case of Kerner v. 
Flemming23 seemingly engrafted onto the existing elements which 
the Secretary must establish in order to support his denial of disa-
bility benefits an additional substantive element-proof of the 
availability of specific employment opportunities for the claimant 
in question. Arguably, the Kerner decision simply apportioned to 
the Secretary the burden of producing evidence both of what the 
claimant is able to do and of the availability of job opportunities 
for a person of the claimant's capacities in order to rebut the claim-
ant's prima facie case and support a denial of benefits.24 Using this 
concept as a springboard, however, other courts have made the issue 
of availability of employment a substantive element of the Secretary's 
affirmative burden. Under the most recent decisions, the Secretary, in 
order to win affirmance of his denial of benefits, must produce evi-
dence which supports specific findings (based upon the particular 
claimant's ability, education, background, and experience) that there 
is work available which the claimant can perform.25 The Secretary's 
failure to produce this evidence normally entitles the claimant to 
prevail on his prima facie case.26 The consequence, at least in terms 
of results, of this amplification of the concept introduced in Kerner 
has been to shift the ultimate burden of persuasion to the Secretary. 
The judiciary, until recently, had been ambiguous in construing 
the actual impact of the Kerner doctrine on the scope of the 
Secretary's burden of proof. Consequently, the Secretary, in striv-
ing to forestall a literal application of Kerner, has experienced 
considerable difficulty and frustration with his burden of proof 
in the reviewing courts. The court in the Kerner decision expressly 
cautioned the Secretary that the "mere theoretical opportunity to 
engage in substantial gainful activity is not enough if no reasonable 
opportunity for this is available."27 Although Kerner expressly 
recognized the Secretary's expertise in furnishing information as 
to job opportunities, subsequent decisions examining the question 
have indicated a lack of satisfaction with the Secretary's bare pro-
nouncement that there are light or sedentary jobs available which 
the claimant is capable of performing.28 In attempting to satisfy this 
23. 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960). 
24. Id. at 921. "The burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion is, 
of course, in cases like this upon the plaintiff. However, it does not follow that the 
court is bound to sustain a denial of disability benefits where the applicant has raised 
a serious question and the evidence affords no sufficient basis for the Secretary's 
negative answer.'' Id. at 922. 
25. E.g., Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Prewitt v. Celebrezze, 
330 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1964); Keeney v. Celebrezze, 1 CCH UNEMP. !Ns. REP. 1J 16332 
(S.D. W. Va. 1964). 
26. E.g., Ratliff v. Celebrezze, 338 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1964); Brill v. Celebrezze, 232 
F. Supp. 296 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Powell v. Celebrezze, 230 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Ark. 1964). 
27. Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 921 (2d Cir. 1960). 
28, E.g., Janek v. Celebrezze, 336 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1964); Miles v. Celebrezze, 233 
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judicial demand for more detailed support for his findings as to em-
ployment opportunities actually available to an individual of the 
claimant's capacities,29 the Secretary has frequently utilized govern-
mental and industrial studies of various occupational and vocational 
opportunities. The courts initially tended to accept these studies as 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Kerner test.30 But as 
courts have become progressively more stringent as to the proof 
required of the Secretary, these studies have met with increasing 
hostility and frequently have been rejected as being too conjec-
tural. 31 Consequently, although such studies may be of some evi-
dentiary value, under presently accepted standards they are insuffi-
cient, standing alone, to prove the availability of job opportunities 
unless they are expressly related to the situation of the particular 
claimant.32 
Some courts adhering to the majority view have recently ex-
tended this subjective approach by adding new requirements to 
the Secretary's burden of producing evidence of availability of 
actual job opportunities. The first of these new requirements was 
the demand for consideration of actual hiring practices. The court 
in Thomas v. Celebrezze,33 after rejecting the Secretary's use of 
Labor Department studies as proof of the availability of jobs that the 
claimant was capable of performing, emphasized the desirability of 
F. Supp. 767 (W.D.S.C. 1964); Thompson v. Celebrezze, 334 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1964); 
Hamilton v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Ky. 1964); Keeney v. Celebrezze, 1 CCH 
UNEMP. INs. REP. 1f 16332 (S.D. W. Va. 1964). 
29. E.g., Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964); Stancavage v. Celebrezze, 
323 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1963) (the Secretary must produce evidence of a "genuine 
employment opportunity" for this particular claimant); Odom v. Celebrezze, 230 F. 
Supp. 732 (E.D.N.C. 1964). 
30. E.g., Rinaldi v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1962) (governmental studies 
"conclusive" as to claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity); Graham 
v. Ribicoff, 295 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1961). See Moke v. Celebrezze, 236 F. Supp. 174 
(N.D. Cal. 1964). Compare King v. Celebrezze, 223 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Ky. 1963), with 
Woods v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Ky. 1964). 
31. Stancavage v. Celebrezze, 323 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1963). See Thomas v. Celebrezze, 
331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Haliszik v. Celebrezze, 1 CCH UNEMP. INs. REP. 1f 16406 
(M.D. Pa. 1964). Recently, some courts have adopted a balancing approach: "When 
1 
considered with all of the other evidence, the publications may or may not be deemed 
to contribute to proof constituting substantial evidence." McDaniel v. Celebrezze, 331 
F.2d 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1964). Such studies alone may still be considered "substantial 
evidence" in the Second Circuit. See Rinaldi v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1962). 
The McDaniel decision also discussed the use of medical texts as evidence. There has 
been substantial support for attempts to formulate uniform standards and guides to 
be used in medical evaluation of impairment and disability. See, e.g., Palmer, Medical 
Evaluation of Impairment-Not Disability, 16 VAND. L. REv. 1107 (1963); Thurber, 
Observations on Disability Evaluation, Medical Trial Techniques Quarterly, Sept. 
1959, p. 59. 
32. For instance, in some jurisdictions such studies are inadequate unless they 
indicate availability of employment opportunities in the vicinity of claimant's home. 
See cases cited notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text. 
33. 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964). 
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having the Secretary focus on the question from the point of view 
of an employer: "Employers are concerned with substantial capa-
city, psychological stability, and steady attendance; they will not 
unduly risk increasing their health and liability insurance costs. It is 
unrealistic to think they would hire anyone with the impairments 
of this claimant."34 
Carrying the specificity concept one step further, some courts 
have compelled the Secretary to consider the "economic realities" 
of obtaining employment in the immediate area for persons with 
the claimant's disabilities.35 Consequently, it now appears that the 
Secretary's burden resulting from these new requirements can be 
satisfied only by proving that particular employers in the vicinity 
of the claimant's home will actually hire the claimant in question. 
For example, in Cyrus v. Celebrezze36 a vocational expert testified 
that jobs in the shoe industry which the claimant could perform 
were available locally. The court considered this evidence inade-
quate because the expert had not actually contacted the only shoe 
manufacturer in the area to see if they employed any people for 
these jobs. In a similar case, the testimony of a vocational expert, 
consisting of evidence of specific job opportunities for the claimant 
within sixty miles of his home, was deemed insufficient because the 
expert was unable to say definitely that the claimant would actually 
be hired by the particular employers.37 
Despite the departure from the statutory allocation and scope of 
the burden, the requirement that the Secretary prove the ability 
of the claimant to engage in some substantial gainful activity may 
be justified on policy grounds. Disability claimants are frequently 
not represented by counsel in presenting their claims.38 In addi-
tion, current disability cases involve a high percentage of indigent, 
uneducated, and elderly applicants who cannot be expected to 
hire various experts, analyze records, or effectively cross-examine 
witnesses. In contrast, the Secretary has a professional staff experi-
enced in disability litigation. Furthermore, an administrative regu-
lation which severely limits fees payable to counsel of disability 
34. Id. at 546. Accord, Blankenship v. Celebrezze, 232 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. W. Va. 
1964). A variation of this approach requires the Secretary to imagine himself as an 
"employment counselor." See Brill v. Celebrezze, 232 F. Supp. 296 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). 
35. E.g., Frazier v. Celebrezze, IA CCH UNEMP. INs. REP. 1 14022 (E.D.S.C. 1965); 
Green v. Celebrezze, 236 F. Supp. 768 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Freeman v. Celebrezze, 236 F. 
Supp. 785 (M.D.N.C. 1964); Seldomridge v. Celebrezze, IA CCH UNEMP. INs. REP. 
4J 14016 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
36. IA CCH UNEMP. !Ns. REP. ~ 14021 (4th Cir. 1965). 
37. Frazier v. Celebrezze, IA CCH UNEMP. INs. REP. 1 14022 (E.D.S.C. 1965). It 
would appear that this burden far exceeds that originally contemplated by the court 
in Kerner. See Kerner v. Celebrezze, IA CCH UNEMP. INS. REP. ,J 14011 (2d Cir. 1965). 
38. It has been suggested that this was the question to which the court in Kerner 
was addressing itself, rather than to the question of burden of proof. See 2 DAVIS, 
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 42 (Supp. 1963). 
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claimants39 may hinder the hiring of qualified counsel and dis-
courage the efforts of counsel actually engaged. As one court ob-
served, this limitation "acts as a rather effective bar to the benefits 
of educated and trained advocacy."40 When the claimant's statutory 
burden to prove a broad negative is added to these factors, general 
considerations of both policy and fairness seem to warrant some 
judicial effort to shift a portion of the claimant's burden to the 
Secretary. 41 
However, requiring the introduction of evidence of actual em-
ployment opportunities as an additional element necessary to sup-
port the Secretary's disallowance of a claim seems untenable. The 
legislative history and language of the Social Security Act clearly 
prohibit consideration of this factor in determining disability.42 
Moreover, taking account of specific job opportunities in the im-
mediate geographical area brings the program very close to granting 
compensation for mere unemployment rather than for physical or 
mental disability. If the availability of employment opportunities 
is to be recognized to some degree as a substantive element in de-
termining disability (as certainly it is under current judicial prac-
tice) the Secretary's superior access to employment and vocational 
information43 and the policy considerations discussed above perhaps 
justify allocating to him the burden of proving the availability of 
particular jobs in the national labor market. However, recent deci-
sions requiring the Secretary to prove unequivocally the existence 
of a job opening for the claimant in the immediate area44 may 
render the Secretary's burden of persuasion insuperable. The effect 
is to convert the Secretary into an employment agent for every 
claimant whom he considers non-disabled once the claimant proves 
his inability to engage in his former work. This result seems un-
reasonable and administratively impractical in light of the amount 
of appellate litigation of disability determinations facing the Secre-
tary45 and the dominant role originally contemplated for the Secre-
tary in the disability benefits legislation. If actual availability of 
employment in the immediate area is to be an integral element of 
39. 20 C.F.R. § 404.796 (1960). Under this regulation it is a criminal offense for 
counsel to charge a fee in excess of fifty dollars for his services and appeals within 
the various administrative levels without having received the prior approval of the 
Social Security Administration. 
40. Perry v. Celebrezze, 236 F. Supp. I, 2 n.l (W .D.S.C. 1964). See also Farley v. 
Celebrezze, 315 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1963); Seldomridge v. Celebrezze, IA CCH UNEMP. !Ns. 
REP. 1J 14016 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
41. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940). 
42. See notes 9-15 supra and accompanying text. 
43. Placing the burden of proof on the party having easier access to knowledge 
about the fact in question is a recognized judicial practice. See James, Burdens of 
Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 60 (1961). 
44. See notes 35.37 supra and accompanying text. 
45. See notes 8 and 16 supra. 
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the program, the claimant should have some obligation in that
respect, such as including, as an element of his prima facie case,
proof of a good faith effort to secure employment before seeking
benefits.
Legislation has recently been introduced in Congress which
would amend the social security laws to provide a purely occupa-
tional definition of disability. A claimant would be deemed disabled
if he were "unable to engage in the occupation or employment last
performed by him on a regular basis" before disability.4 6 Presuma-
bly, while this definition would still require the claimant to sustain
his present prima facie burden of proving inability to engage in his
former occupation, consideration of the availability of other job
opportunities would be abandoned and the burden of persuasion
now on the Secretary would be reduced to a relatively narrow re-
quirement that he rebut the applicant's claim by proving his ability
to engage in his former work. Moreover, this definition would miti-
gate the claimant's burden under the view now held by the Fifth
Circuit4 7 and would thus induce a judicial uniformity regarding
the burdens of proof on both the Secretary and the claimant. How-
ever, despite its potential contributions to clarity and uniformity in
review of disability determinations, a legislative shift to a purely
occupational standard of disability would probably increase the
number of successful disability claimants and alter the entire scope
and nature of the program. Regardless of whether this particular
amendment is enacted, it is clearly time for Congress to re-examine
the scope and administration of the disability benefits legislation
in the light of the intent of the drafters of the 1956 amendments to
the Social Security Act.
46. H.R. 911, H.R. 805, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
47. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text.
Notes 1473
